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Social interactions and personal tastes shape our consumption behaviors of cultural prod-
ucts. In this study, we present a computational model of a cultural market and we aim
to analyze the behavior of the consumer population as an emergent phenomena. Our
results suggest that the final market shares of the cultural products dramatically depend
on the consumer heterogeneity and social interaction pressure. Furthermore, the relation
between the resulting market shares and the social interaction is robust with respect to
a wide range of variation in the parameter values and the type of topology.
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1. Introduction and Relevant Studies
Social interaction is an inevitable aspect of our lives and a very strong ingredient
of our decision processes. Most of our decisions depend, at least partially, on what
other people think and how they behave. The extent of the society’s influence on our
behaviors may range from daily decisions such as what to wear at work to political
decisions such as which party to vote for in the elections. The importance of the
social interaction has been reflected in the social sciences for many decades and a
growing body of research continues on the intersection of various disciplines includ-
ing but not limited to sociology, cognitive sciences, physics and economics. 1,2,3,4,5,6
Statistical physics has a long history of dealing with interacting particles and emer-
gent phenomena. Some of the techniques employed by statistical physics are also
applied to human populations successfully and offer us new ways to explore the
dynamics in social systems. 7,8,9,10,11,12
The interaction between the macro dynamics and individual decision processes
is an active area of research in computational sociology and statistical physics (i.e.
1
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sociophysics). Problems in which the agents in a community are faced with a binary
decision such as to vote for or against a legislation or to buy a particular product
or not are extensively studied by the statistical physicists. 2,3,8,10,12 The Random
Field Ising Model (RFIM) is a commonly investigated model to analyze such situ-
ations. 8,10,11,13,14,15 There are also other problems in which the opinions of the
agents are represented as multidimensional continuous vectors and are influenced
by the opinions of other agents. 16
In this paper, we investigate the effect of social interactions on the consumption
behaviors of people in a market. In a cultural market, there are many items compet-
ing with each other and the decision to consume an item or not is not independent
of the consumption decisions of other items. The consumers have to pick one or
more items from a wider pool of opportunities.
An empirical study carried out by Salganik et al. (2006) provides experimental
evidence that social influence has an effect on the consumption decisions of peo-
ple. 17 In the experiment, the subjects are faced with a web based application in
which they can listen to and rate as many songs as they like among 48 songs of
previously unknown bands. After they listen to and rate a song, they are offered the
opportunity to download the song. The study reports the results of two different
experimental conditions. The first one is called the independent condition in which
the subjects only see the names of the songs without any other information and
make their decisions independently from the other subjects. The second condition
is called the social influence condition and in this case, the number of people who
have downloaded each song so far is also given to the subjects. The number of down-
loads of a song is called the success of the song. Any significant difference in the
success of the same song between the two cases can be attributed to the availability
of social information since there is no other experimental difference between the two
settings.
The key finding of the study is that the availability of the social information sig-
nificantly affects the way people behave. In the social influence condition, variation
of the success outcomes of the songs are much higher than it is in the independent
condition. This suggests that in the social influence case, some songs are down-
loaded many more times than they are in the independent case. Another measure
they report is called the unpredictability of a song and is found by calculating the
average difference between the success values of a song over different realizations of
the same condition (i.e. the experimental condition is repeated several times with
different subjects). If a song tends to get the same outcomes over different realiza-
tions then its unpredictability value is low otherwise it is high. As a result of the
experiment, the social influence condition leads to higher unpredictability values for
the songs.
Borghesi and Bouchaud (2007) propose a generalization of the RFIM such that it
allows to study multiple choices made by the agents simultaneously. 18 They show
that it is possible to estimate some parameters of the model from the empirical
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data of Salganik et al. 17. Furthermore, they report that the behavior of the model
changes qualitatively for low and high values of social pressure which is in alignment
with the empirical findings.
Another line of research is carried out under social percolation models. 19 In this
approach, consumers and producers are modeled as adaptive agents and the hit or
failure of products are studied as a result of the information contagion between the
consumers.
2. Methodology
2.1. The Cultural Market Model
The kind of market we are interested in is one where the items are easily reproducible
so that their supply is practically unlimited and the consumers have to pick a
subset of the available items to consume. An example of such a market is the
cultural market where the items are cultural products such as books, movies, or
music albums. Two major components of a cultural market are the set of consumers
and the set of cultural items. Like Weisbuch and Solomon (2003), we use the movie
market as an example in which the consumers are the customers of the movie
theaters and items are the movies on the market. 19
An important assumption about a cultural market is that one of the factors
effective in the consumption decision is the social pressure exerted on the individual.
Theoretically, the effect may be both negative or positive but we focus on the case
where it is positive (i.e. if an item is consumed more by the others, then it will have
a greater chance to be consumed by the individual). The literature of psychology
and economics have a large set of findings and different reasons for such effects. 1
Formally speaking, the model consists of N agents and M items. We index the
agents by Roman labels i and j (both in [1, N ]) and the items by Greek labels α
and β (both in [1,M ]).
The agents are assumed to be located at the vertices of an undirected graph
which incorporates the social structure of the community. If there is a link between
agent i and agent j then these two agents are said to be neighbors of each other.
Initially, none of the items are consumed. The model advances in discrete time
steps and each time step the agents form their opinions about the items. The opinion
of an agent i about an item α is represented by oiα ∈ R. At each time step, each
agent picks the item with the highest opinion value and consumes it. An agent can
consume an item only once so the selection is carried over non-consumed items.
For each agent and item pair, oiα is calculated as a weighted average of personal
preferences and social pressure as oiα = γsiα + (1 − γ)liα.
Social component siα represents the social pressure exerted on the agent i to
consume the item α. In our model, we use a simple function which computes, for each
agent i, the ratio of the number of neighbors who have consumed the item α to the
total number of neighbors. Note that siα ∈ [0, 1]. Such a definition of social pressure
is in accordance with our previous discussions since an agent will be more inclined
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towards consuming an item if a majority of its neighbors have already consumed it.
Note that, in reality the social pressure is a function of time (siα = siα(t)) because
as the agents consume items its value changes. Our implementation of the model is
a synchronized one in the sense that at the start of a time step the social pressure
is calculated according to current state and updated only when the time step is
completed.
Personal preferences liα ∈ R are predetermined and time independent values
representing the likings of agents for the items. The value liα corresponds to the
idiosyncratic personal taste of agent i for the item α. Higher values indicate higher
preferences for the item.
The value γ ∈ [0, 1] is the social pressure parameter which determines the
strength of the social pressure on the decision process. The case γ = 0 corresponds
to the pure-individualistic community where no agent cares about what others are
doing (hence basing their decisions solely on their idiosyncratic liking values), γ = 1
corresponds to the pure-social environment where all decisions are based on the be-
haviors of others.
2.2. Initial Configuration
Topology: For the base case, the topology of the agents is set to a ring lattice with a
coordination number of k (i.e. agents are located in a ring topology and each agent
is connected to its nearest k neighbors). But the effect of employing other topologies
is also investigated.
Personal preferences : Personal preference data isolated from any social effect
is very hard to obtain and no publicly available dataset was known to us at the
time of this study. We represent the personal preference of the agents for the items
as real numbers and assume that the idiosyncratic personal liking values liα come
from a normal distribution with mean µα and standard deviation σα. This is an
assumption that can be validated (or invalidated) in the future. Without any prior
knowledge, assuming the liking values for the items come from a normal distribution
specific to each item seems appropriate.
To simplify the matters more, we set the mean values of the distributions equal
to each other (i.e. µα = µ where µ is a model parameter) due to our assumption
that no item has any intrinsic superiority in terms of liking values over another
item a priori. Although this seems unrealistic, such an assumption can only weaken
the inequalities that we observe as a result of the simulations and does not pose
a problem to the conclusions made. Furthermore, it is trivial to show that the
particular value of the parameter µ does not change anything in the dynamics of
the model hence we can set µ = 0. Since only the ranking of the items are considered
in the decision of the agents, an initial configuration with a non zero µ value can
be safely turned into a zero-µ configuration by subtracting µ from every liα.
The value σα is called the intra-item liking deviation of item α and denotes the
standard deviation in the liking values of agents for the same item. As a further
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simplification for the model, we assume all items have the same intra-item deviation
and let σα = σ for all α where σ is a model parameter.
2.3. Remarks
We assume that consumption rates of the agents are constant and same for all.
That means at each time step, each agent consumes exactly one item. Naturally,
with these assumptions, all agents will consume all items after M steps. In our
model, a cultural item is available on the market until the end of the simulation.
In real world however, not all items stay available in the market for an indefinite
time period. Considering the movie market example, not all movies are shown in
the theaters long enough to allow all consumers to see them. There is a continuous
entrance and exit of movies. In order to keep our model simple, we ignore this fact
but decide to terminate the simulations much before the point of total consumption
(i.e. after T steps with T < M). In other words, our model is limited to a simplified
version of the real world whereM items are put on the market at the same time and
none of them leaves the market until the simulation ends. In addition, we assume
that a single agent cannot consume all available items on the market but a small
fraction of them.
We have seen that the liking values liα are chosen from a normal distribution
with µ = 0 and the same σ for all α. The fact that the expected average value of the
liking values of an item over all agents is 0 does not imply that the sample mean of
its liking values will be zero. Let 〈lα〉 =
∑N
i=1 liα/N denote the sample mean of the
liking values of item α over all agents. We call 〈lα〉 as the quality of item α. The
Central Limit Theorem states that the distribution of the quality values will follow
a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ/
√
N for large N . 20
In the limit N →∞ the deviation of the quality values approaches to 0. Although
the model assumes no a priori superiority of an item over another, we should expect
to see different item quality values for different realizations of the model for finite
and small N .
2.4. Quantities of Interest
We define the market share, 〈cα〉, of an item α as the ratio of consumers who have
consumed that item so far. It is calculated as 〈cα〉 =
∑N
i=1 ciα/N where ciα is 1 if
agent i has consumed the item α before the current time step and to 0 otherwise.
Note that the market share of an item is defined such that the sum of the market
shares of all items at a given time does not have to sum up to 1.
Item quality, 〈lα〉, is already defined as the average liking value of an item over
all agents for an item α.
Market Inequality, I, represents the difference between the market shares of the
cultural items. As a measure of the inequality, we calculate the Gini index of the
November 13, 2018 13:0 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE bingol
6 Amac¸ Herdag˘delen, Haluk Bingol
market shares of all items. The market inequality is defined as follows.
I =
(
∑M
α=1
∑M
β=1 |〈cα〉 − 〈cβ〉|)/M2
(2
∑M
α=1〈cα〉)/M
(1)
which can be interpreted as half the relative expected difference between the market
shares of two randomly chosen items. 17 A perfectly equal market where all items
have the same market shares will have an inequality value of 0; that is the Gini
index of a perfectly equal market.
The market inequality value is a symmetrical measure with respect to the quality
values of the items. It does not differentiate whether it is the low quality items that
receive unfairly high market shares or the high quality items. In order to answer the
question of whether there is a general trend favoring the high quality items in terms
of market shares or vice versa, we employ a simple measure that is used in statistics
which we call the quartile difference. First, we divide the items into four quartiles
according to their quality values. The items with the top 25% quality values are
placed in the upper quartile U and the items with the bottom 25% quality values
are placed in the lower quartile L. Quartile difference, Q, is simply the difference
between average market shares of the two quartiles. Since the number of items in the
upper and lower quartiles are one forth of N (|U| = |L| = N/4), quartile difference
is defined as
Q =
∑
α∈U
〈cα〉
N/4
−
∑
α∈L
〈cα〉
N/4
(2)
The quartile difference is a signed value so the minimal value it can take is -1
and this occurs in the extreme case in which all items in the lower quartile have
market shares of 1 and all the items in the upper quartile have market shares of 0.
Similarly, the maximal value it can assume can be computed as +1.
3. Results and Discussions
All results reported in this section are based on values obtained by averaging over
100 independent runs of the simulation with the same parameters.
It is natural to ask if the quality of an item determines its market share at the
end or not. A reasonable expectation about a cultural market is that items with
high quality values should get higher market shares on the average. As a starter,
we let γ = 0 and σ = 1 which corresponds to the pure-individualistic community
where all agents base their consumption decisions solely on their personal tastes.
We keep the number of agents and the number of items fixed to 100 in this set of
experiments (i.e. N = 100 and M = 100). The sensitivity of the results on these
parameters will be investigated separately. Since there is no social interaction, the
underlying topology has no effect on the results because its possible effects are ruled
out with the zero social pressure parameter (i.e. γ = 0). We let the model run for
5, 20 and 50 steps (i.e. T ∈ {5, 20, 50}). In Fig. 1, we see the scatter plot of quality
versus market shares of the items for three cases.
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Fig. 1. Market shares versus quality values for no social pressure. The simulation length T is (a)
5, (b) 20, and (c) 50.
Let us first consider the case with T = 5 given in Fig. 1(a). The relation between
the quality and market share has a linear form. A linear relation also holds for the
other two cases with T = 20 and T = 50 given in Fig. 1(b) and 1(c) correspondingly.
Prolonging the simulation increases both total consumption and market shares.
This observation is trivial given the model definition and can be verified by noting
the data points are shifted up for higher T values. Another expected result is that
high quality items receive higher market shares and this is reflected in the positive
slope values of the data points for all figures. A last observation is that the rate of
market share increase differs with respect to the quality values of the items. The
slopes, m, of the best fitting lines are significantly different for different values of
T : mT=5 = 0.10, mT=20 = 0.28, and mT=50 = 0.40. This means that high quality
items increase their market shares at an higher rate than the low quality items.
As we already noted before, the simulation length (i.e. number of steps that the
simulation will run for) is an important parameter and should be set carefully with
keeping in mind the actual market to be modeled. It is obvious that values of T very
close to the number of items (i.e. 100 at the moment) are highly unrealistic. We set
T = 20 during the next set of experiments for simplicity of analyses. Such a setting
leads to a market where each agent consumes 20 percent of all available items. Even
though a choice of 20 seems arbitrary, further simulations revealed that as long as
the simulation length is appreciably smaller than the number of items, the market
shares and the quartile difference values do not change abruptly for differing values
of T . 21 Unfortunately, the plots of these simulations are omitted in this paper due
to space restrictions.
An interesting extension will be introducing social pressure (i.e. γ > 0). To
keep things simple for the moment, we create two parameter settings: One with
γ = 0.3 corresponding to low social pressure and one with γ = 0.7 corresponding to
high social pressure. With the introduction of social pressure, the topology of the
neighborhood relations becomes important. For the moment, we set the topology
to a fully connected graph which corresponds to a ring lattice with a coordination
number k = N − 1. An informative way to look at the effect of social pressure is
to compare the market shares obtained for low and high social pressure to the ones
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Fig. 2. The effect of introducing social pressure on market shares. (a) Low social pressure versus
no social pressure. (b) High social pressure versus no social pressure. In both figures, the dashed
lines are the y = x lines.
obtained in the community with no social pressure. Using the same personal prefer-
ence values allows us to compare the market shares of the same item under different
social pressure environments. In order to compare the different social pressure set-
tings, we present two figures (Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b)) which contain the scatter
plots of the market shares of the items obtained for low social pressure versus for no
social pressure and high social pressure versus no social pressure correspondingly.
It is also possible to look at the scatter plots of quality and market shares
obtained in these social settings. Since we have seen that quality and market shares
are linearly related for no social pressure, this comparison also helps us to see the
relation between quality and the market shares obtained in social pressure settings.
These plots are omitted in this paper but they are in perfect accordance with the
market share comparison graphs.
We obtain similar results for low social pressure and no social pressure. The data
points are scattered around the y = x line in Fig. 2(a) indicating that the effect of
setting γ = 0.3 has no or limited effect on the final market shares of the items. For
low social pressure, the consumption decisions remain fairly intact compared to no
social pressure.
For high social pressure, the relation between the quality and market share
of an item is no longer linear as Fig. 2(b) suggests. The items which obtain high
market shares for no social pressure obtain even higher market shares for high social
pressure and the items which obtain low market shares for no social pressure obtain
even lower market shares for high social pressure.
These results are compatible with the experimental data obtained in the study
of Salganik et al. (2006) (see Fig 3 in Ref. 17). In this experimental study, the
introduction of social information causes a non linearity between the market shares
obtained with the presence of social pressure or no social pressure. Our model is
able to generate this phenomenon.
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Fig. 3. Effect of intra-item liking deviation σ (line series) and social pressure γ on (a) the in-
equality of the market shares I, (b) quartile difference Q.
What is the response of our model to varying degrees of social pressure? How
can we extend our findings for communities with varying degrees of heterogeneity?
The model parameter γ regulates the extent of social pressure and intra-item liking
deviance σ regulates the heterogeneity of the agents in the community. Until now,
we set σ = 1 but this choice is arbitrary. Smaller choices for σ will lead to more
homogeneous communities in the sense that the liking values of the agents for the
same items will be closer to each other. Higher choices on the other hand, will
correspond to more heterogeneous communities because the liking values of the
agents for the same items will deviate more.
In order to come up with answers to the two questions we ask, we calculated
the market inequality I and the quartile difference Q of the markets at the end of
20 steps for different pairs of γ and σ values. Fig. 3 visualizes the differing values
of I and Q correspondingly.
In Fig. 3(a), we see the effect of increasing social pressure γ on the market
inequality for different values of σ. As we have already seen previously, higher γ
values lead to higher market inequality values but the characteristic of the effect
depends on σ. We see that the marker inequality values show a sharp increase from
low values (e.g. I = 0.2) to high values (e.g. I = 0.8) at critical values of γ. However
the specific value of the critical γ value depends on σ.
The market inequality is a measure of how varied the final market shares are. It
does not tell us anything about the dependence of market shares on quality. We have
already seen that higher social pressure results in increased market shares for the
high quality items. Figure 3(b) visualizes the effect of increasing social pressure on
the quartile difference Q for different values of intra-item liking deviation. Similar
to the market inequality value, the quartile difference also shows a sharp increase
at a critical value of γ and the specific value of γ depends on σ. However, at
higher levels of social pressure the quartile difference starts to decrease. The turning
point for the quartile difference (i.e. the γ value that it starts to decrease) is again
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dependent on σ. This is an interesting observation because after the turning point
the inequality value continues to increase while the quartile difference starts to
decrease. Considering the extreme case where γ = 1 may help to understand this
phenomenon. When γ = 1, the agents will not consider the liking values in their
decision process but only the number of neighbors who have consumed the items.
Thus, the quality values of the items will be irrelevant in affecting their market
shares leading to a quartile difference value of zero.
Interpreting the results for inequality and quartile difference values together we
conclude that there exists a critical region of γ and for values less then the criti-
cal region the inequality and quartile difference values are in accordance with each
other. High quality items gain higher market shares as we increase the social pres-
sure and this fact is reflected in increased inequality and quartile difference values.
But once the critical turning point in social pressure is passed, the relation between
the quality and market share starts to weaken, but some items still continue to
arbitrarily high market shares at the cost of others. Hence the inequality value con-
tinues to increase. The positive correlation between the quality and market shares
disappears suddenly as reflected by the decrease in quartile difference value.
In order to assess whether the reported findings are robust with respect to the
model parameters, we repeated the simulations with different parameter setting.
Due to space limitations, we are unable to give a detailed report of those simulations
but the results are given in an unpublished masters thesis. 21
We repeated the simulations for N ∈ {100, 1000, 5000, 10000} and M ∈
{100, 1000, 5000} and the results were qualitatively the same with the results we
report in this study. Also the effect of the number of neighbors k and the topology
is investigated. Even for very low values of k and random topology with directed
links, we did not observe qualitative differences compared to ring lattice.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
Empirical findings suggested that the introduction of social interaction has a pro-
found effect on the relation between the quality and market share of an item. For
low values of social pressure (i.e. γ = 0.3), we observed that the linear relation
between the quality and market shares remains almost intact. As we increase the
social pressure parameter (γ = 0.7), the linearity was disrupted and we observed
nonlinear relation in favor of high quality items.
An interesting finding is that the social pressure parameter does not regulate the
collective nature of the model but interacts with σ which represents the deviation
among the liking values of the agents for the same items. We found out that a
given market inequality value I can be reproduced by a set of (γ, σ) pairs and
the interaction between the two parameters remain qualitatively intact for different
number of agents N and average number of neighbors k.
To our surprise, while the inequality in the market shares increases with increas-
ing social pressure, the quartile difference value first increases and than decreases
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with a peak at a critical value of social pressure dependent on σ. As we increase
social pressure, the high quality items gain more and more market shares at the
cost of low quality items and this is reflected in the increased inequality and quartile
difference values. But after the critical social pressure value is passed, the positive
correlation between the quality and market share deteriorates. Low quality items
starts to gain higher market shares and quartile difference shows a decrease. Note
that we cannot observe this trend just by looking at the market inequality which
continues to increase as we increase the social pressure. These findings suggest that
for higher values of social pressure the dynamics of the model gets history dependent
and the resulting market share of an item is determined by the initial conditions of
the system rather than the quality of the item.
We carried out extended simulations to see if our results depend on specific values
of the parameters or robust to different values of the parameters. We concluded
that the qualitative nature of the simulations are robust with respect to different
number of agents (i.e. N ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 5000}) and varying degrees of network
connectivity (i.e. for different values of k < N). The topology on the other hand
seems to be affecting the outcome of the cultural market. The sharp increases in the
inequality and quartile difference were more resilient to varying number of agents
in random topology than the ring topology.
We studied the ring topology as a base model and introduced the heterogeneity
by using random topology. How the model will behave if another type of network
such as scale free or small world is introduced is definitely an interesting and non-
trivial question and needs to be addressed in the future studies. Also the effect of
introducing directed links and asymmetrical neighboring relations can be investi-
gated in the future.
Another important point is to study the accordance between the real world data
and the model output. Unfortunately, during the writing of this paper, no rele-
vant dataset was publicly available. With the limited information available from a
previous experiment (Ref. 17) we were able to show that our model can produce
compatible results and it can provide an explanation for the observed differences
in the market share, item quality relations and market inequality values depend-
ing on the availability of social information. Additionally, we believe that study
of such computational models is meaningful given the costs of conducting a real
world experiment is many times higher than building and analyzing a computa-
tional model. The results and the dynamics of the cultural market model can be of
use in determining the settings of a real world experiment in the future.
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